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Colorado Constitution/ARTICLE V LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT /Section 44. Representatives in congress.
The general assembly shall divide the state into as many congressional districts as there are representatives in congress apportioned to this state by the congress of the United States for the election of one representative to congress from each district. When a new apportionment shall be made by congress, the general assembly shall divide the state into congressional districts accordingly.
Source: Entire article added, effective August 1, 1876, see L. 1877, p. 44. L. 74: Entire section amended, p. 451, effective January 1, 1975.
Cross references: For congressional apportionment, see also § 2-1-101.
Am. Jur.2d. See 25 Am. Jur.2d, Elections, §§ 7, 8, 10, 19.
C.J.S. See 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 178.
Law reviews. For article, "Reapportionment, The Courts, and the Voting Rights Act: A Resegregation of the Political Process?", see 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
General assembly determines congressional districts. The general assembly retains the power to change congressional districts merely by changing the basis of division. Board of County Comm'rs v. City & County of Denver, 150 Colo. 198, 372 P.2d 152 (1962), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 226, 83 S. Ct. 679, 9 L. Ed.2d 714 (1963).
Goal of redistricting is fair and effective representation. The primary goal of an acceptable congressional redistricting plan should be fair and effective representation of all citizens. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
Population equality standard is the pre-eminent, if not the sole, criterion on which to adjudge the constitutionality of congressional redistricting plans. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
Absence of racial discrimination. The second constitutional criterion used in analyzing redistricting plans is the absence of racial discrimination. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
Nonconstitutional criteria for evaluating redistricting plans. Additional nonconstitutional criteria may be used in evaluating congressional redistricting plans. These criteria can be grouped into three categories: (1) Compactness and contiguity; (2) preservation of county and municipal boundaries; and (3) preservation of communities of interest. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
Compactness and contiguity, as criteria for redistricting, were originally designed to represent a restraint on partisan gerrymandering. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
County and municipal boundaries should remain undivided whenever possible, because the sense of community derived from established governmental units tends to foster effective representation. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
Concept of "community of interest" applies to congressional redistricting, since formulating a plan without any such consideration would constitute a wholly arbitrary and capricious exercise. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
"Communities of interest" represent distinctive units which share common concerns with respect to one or more identifiable features such as geography, demography, ethnicity, culture, socio-economic status, or trade. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
And community of interest requirements must yield to equality of population. In re Colorado General Assembly, 828 P.2d 185 (Colo. 1992).
Redistricting plan unconstitutional. The congressional redistricting plan set forth in § 2-1-101 is unconstitutional. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
Section 2-1-101 is unconstitutional because it provides for only five congressional districts instead of the six districts mandated by the 1980 apportionment of the House of Representatives. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
For judicially-fashioned redistricting plan, see Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982).
District court properly exercised jurisdiction over congressional redistricting. Because the general assembly and governor were unable to enact a plan for congressional redistricting, the district court was forced to adopt a plan. Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642 (Colo. 2002).
In an action to adopt a congressional redistricting plan, the secretary of state was the proper defendant because she was required to implement the court-ordered redistricting plan. Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642 (Colo. 2002).
A redistricting controversy is ripe when a court lacks assurance that a redistricting plan will be enacted in time for an upcoming election. District court waited to announce its decision until after the general assembly had another chance to enact its own plan. Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642 (Colo. 2002).
Objection to court-adopted congressional redistricting plan must be denied when objector cannot establish first prong of the Thornburg v. Gingles test that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a numerical majority in the district. Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642 (Colo. 2002).
The satisfaction of the factors enumerated in article V, § 47, is not required in the adoption of a congressional redistricting plan. Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642 (Colo. 2002).
Court was not required to adopt a plan that the governor would have approved. When no redistricting plan is enacted through the legislative process, the district court may accord the testimony of the governor whatever evidentiary weight it saw fit. Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642 (Colo. 2002).