Appendix B
Redistricting Local Governments

Since Justice White opined for a majority of the United states Supreme Court in Avery v. Midland County,⁽¹⁾ that "We therefore see little difference, in terms of the application of the Equal Protection Clause and of the principles of Reynolds v. Sims, between the exercise of state power through legislatures and its exercise by elected officials in the cities, towns, and counties," state political subdivisions that have general governmental powers have been subjected over a period of time to most of the same legal standards for redistricting as have the states.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did recognize in the Avery case that neither the Court nor the Constitution should throw up "roadblocks in the path of innovation, experiment, and development among units of local government."⁽²⁾ As a consequence of this reasoning, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed greater latitude to political subdivisions on at least one redistricting principle. As one expert commentator has flatly stated: "Local governments have been allowed greater flexibility regarding equal population standards than have larger political units."⁽³⁾ As the Supreme Court said in Abate v. Mundt:

[T]he facts that local legislative bodies frequently have fewer representatives than do their state and national counterparts and that some local legislative districts may have a much smaller population than do congressional and state legislative districts, lend support to the argument that slightly greater percentage deviations may be tolerable for local government apportionment schemes ... .⁽⁴⁾

The most apparent differences between local jurisdiction redistricting and state and congressional redistricting tend to be dissimilarities of scale and complexity. Although it may be easier to redistrict the state of Montana than New York City, in most instances local jurisdiction redistricting will be less complex than either state or congressional redistricting.

The sheer number and variety of "players," i.e., office holders, special interest groups and interested parties, generally is smaller in local redistricting than at the higher levels.

It is considerably easier to comply with the neutral redistricting principles of compactness and contiguity in local jurisdictions--such as municipalities with census boundaries that run for the most part on existing street grids--than it is to satisfy those principles at the state level where large expanses of sparsely populated areas must be taken into account.

The same is generally true for the "communities of interest" redistricting principle. Although sometimes a topic of heated debate, most local jurisdictions have readily recognizable neighborhoods that are clearly "communities of interest" for redistricting purposes, while less developed areas outside most local jurisdiction boundaries tend to be less identifiable.

Racial principles for redistricting, however, have been applied to local jurisdictions as well as states. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held in disfavor local multimember district plans that dilute minority voting strength.⁽⁵⁾ The Supreme Court established the now famous "not-retrogression standard" in Beer v. United States,⁽⁶⁾ a Voting Rights Act challenge to the combination at-large and ward election system in the city of New Orleans. The "objective criteria" to determine racial discrimination that must be analyzed to arrive at a judgment on the "totality of circumstances" review required by Thornburg v. Gingles⁽⁷⁾ actually originated in local jurisdiction redistricting cases.⁽⁸⁾ There also are many local jurisdictions in 16 different states that fall under the sanction of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,⁽⁹⁾ which requires preclearance by the U.S. Justice Department of any change in the election procedures or districts in those jurisdictions. Of course, all local jurisdictions fall under the aegis of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.⁽¹⁰⁾

1. 390 U.S. 474, 482 (1968).

2. 390 U.S. at 485.

3. Bernard Grofman, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 77, 1985.

4. 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971).

5. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 20 (1975), White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) and Conner v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).

6. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).

7. 428 U.S. 30 (1986).

8. See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (1973) and East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).

9. 42 U.S.C. Sec.1973c (1996).

10. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973 (1996).

This page is maintained by the Redistricting Task Force for the National Conference of State Legislatures

Update:  1/15/99 (psw)

Comments: tom.bottern@senate.mn